Dalelorenzo's GDI Blog

2012 Video of Fauci Promoting Gain-of-Function Bioweapons

Dr. Anthony Fauci, conductor of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases( NIAID) -- an arm of the National Institutes of Health( NIH) that in recent years has money gain-of-function research on at-bat coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology( WIV) -- has denied that such funding occurred.

Fauci told a House Appropriations subcommittee that $600,000 was given to the nonprofit EcoHealth Alliance, which funneled the money to WIV, over a five-year period for the purpose of studying at-bat coronaviruses and whether they could be transmitted to humans. 1

However, involving gain-of-function( GOF) experiment, which refers to studies that have the potential to enhance the ability of pathogens to compel canker, including heighten either their pathogenicity or transmissibility, 2 Fauci said, “That categorically was not done.”3

However, Fauci has long patronage controversial GOF research, which you can hear him speak about in the video above, which boasts a hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs at the U.S. Senate, viewed April 26, 2012.4

Dual Use Research Is Inherently Risky

Dual use research is so reputation because it involves study on select agents and poisons that could either interest culture or destroy it, depending on whether or not it falls into the wrong pass. Fauci specifically speaks about dual help study of concern, or DURC, which involves 15 potentially deadly pathogens, including: 5

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses

Anthrax( Bacillus anthracis)

Botulinum neurotoxin

Burkholderia mallei

Burkholderia pseudomallei

Ebola virus

Foot-and-mouth disease virus

Francisella tularensis

Marburg virus

Reconstructed 1918 influenza virus

Rinderpest virus

Toxin-producing tightens of clostridium botulinum

Smallpox( Variola major)

Smallpox( Variola minor viruses)

Yersinia pestis

DURC involves seven categories of research experiments, according to the U.S. Middle for Disease Control and Prevention, which includes GOF and may: 6

Enhance the harmful consequences of the negotiator or toxin

Disrupt immunity or the efficacy of an immunization against the operator or toxin without clinical and/ or agricultural justification

Confer to the agent or toxin resist to clinically and/ or agricultural useful preventative or care interventions against that negotiator or poison or promotes their capacity to sidestep the methods used in detection

Increase the stability, transmissibility or the ability to disseminate the negotiator or toxin

Alter the emcee array or tropism of the agent or toxin

Enhance the susceptibility of a emcee population to the agent or toxin

Generate or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct negotiator or one of the 15 DURC toxins or agents

Controversy Over H5N 1 GOF Research Began in 2012

Because GOF, or DURC, allows us to start pathogens more easily be allowed to infect humen, it constitutes major biosecurity threats, which obliges publishing of such data almost as contentious as studies and research itself.

Two studies on highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza erupted the discussion in 2012. One, led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Madison-Wisconsin, recognized molecular changes in H5N 1 that would allow it to transmit among mammals. 7

The other, led by Ron Fouchier at Rotterdam University in The Netherlands, genetically modified H5N 1 virus, realizing it airborne transmissible in ferrets. 8 As written in EMBO Reports in 2015:9

“Both groups introduced mutants into highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza( HPAI) that could potentially increase human-to-human transfer of the virus. These mutants are classified as GOF because they increase airborne transmissibility in ferrets -- a good pose for human transmission.

Some in the research and biosecurity societies was worried that these experiments could result in accidental or intentional secretes of the mutated pathogen, or that the now publicly available information about how to increase the human-to-human transmissibility of H5N1 influenza could be abused for developing biological weapons.”

Interestingly, the EMBO report actually was written to protest classifying Fouchier’s work as gain-of-function. However, in January 2012, six months before Fouchier’s article was published, 39 international flu researchers announced a voluntary standstill on study related to H5N 1, who ought to last-place 60 eras but continued until January 23, 2013, due to the highly controversial nature of the studies.

This prompted the U.S. to develop a DURC policy, which was released in March 2012; Fauci references it in the video above. 10

Dual Use Research' Clearly Tips Towards Benefiting Society’

Fauci speaks favorably of DURC, despite an opportunity for grave danger. First, he instills fear in the naturally mutating viruses found in nature , observe, “Indeed, nature itself is the most dangerous bioterrorist, and even as we meet today, H5N1 and other influenza viruses are naturally mutating and changing with the potential of a fatal pandemic. This is not a theoretical threat. It is a real danger.”1 1

He last-minute makes it clear that dual implementation research, including that which explicitly falls under the DURC label, should be allowed to continue: 12

“If a particular research experiment is identified as DURC, that designation is not inevitably means that such research should not been issued , nor that it should even be prohibited in the first place.

However, it does call for us, as you spoke about, to balance carefully the potential benefits of the research to public health, the biosafety and biosecurity conditions under which the research is conducted and the potential risk that the lore gained from such research might fall into the pass of those with misfortune intent.”

Even in the interests of the conflict, Fauci is steadfast in his support of DURC and GOF research, quoting its “clear” benefit to society: 13

“Importantly, the public attention and concern generated by this issue has triggered a voluntary postponement or delay on this type of research on the part of the influenza research community as well as a fresh look at how the U.S. authority administers DURC as manifested by a formalization of both governments wide policy to address the issue.

This policy, which was secreted on March 29, strengthens and formalizes ongoing efforts in DURC oversight and provides a description of my written testimony.

The ultimate goal of the NIH in its embrace of this new policy is to ensure that the conduct and communication of research in this area will remain transparent and open at the same time as the risk-benefit ratio of this research clearly tips towards benefiting society.”

Controversy Due to' Public Misunderstanding’

During the hearing, Fauci downplayed the public controversy over the two H5N 1 DURC studies, calling it a public breach 😛 TAGEND

“I might point out that one of the causes of the public misunderstanding was the widespread impression that the virus that was transmitted by aerosol from one ferret to another actually killed the ferrets when, in fact, that was not the case.”1 4

So, by Fauci’s logic, the fact that the virus was genetically modified into a model that represented it capable of being transmitted via the aura to mammals is inconsequential because it didn’t kill the ferrets during the experiment, and the public uproar that followed was all a misunderstanding. In lending his further supporting, he territory: 15

“We feel that these studies require critical information and it was important to determine if H5N 1 virus that has this enhanced transmissibility would remain sensitive to existing anti-influenza drugs and vaccines. In addition, and importantly, knowledge of the genetic mutations that promote transmitting may be critical for global surveillance of emerging influenza viruses.”

Another moratorium was placed on U.S.-funded GOF research in October 2014, after a cord of concerning contests, including brochure of contentious GOF studies and high-profile “incidents” at U.S. biocontainment laboratories, led to more than 300 scientists propelling a petition calling for an end to gain-of-function research. 16 That postponement was filched in December 2017.17

However, according to Ronnie Cummins, co-founder of the Organic Consumers Association( OCA) and Alexis Baden-Mayer, OCA’s political head( as mentioned earlier in the Mercola link on GOF ventures ):

“Exemptions to this' delay, ’ eventually reviewed by a secret government panel, were nonetheless allowed to go forward. The outlaw was promoted in 2017. Yet between 2014 and 2016, the NIH and Fauci-led NIAID continued money gain-of-function research overseas at the Wuhan lab, via[ Peter] Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance.

Not astonishingly both Fauci and Daszak have been staunch champions of the official Chinese government story that the virus that effects COVID-1 9( SARS-CoV-2)' naturally’ derived from at-bats and/ or other multitude categories to foul humans.”

Clear Links Show NIAID Funded GOF Research

In a May 11, 2021, Senate hearing, Sen. Rand Paul questioned Fauci on the NIAID’s funding of GOF research on bat coronaviruses, some of which was conducted at the WIV. Fauci denied service charges, saying, “The NIH has not ever, and is not now, money gain-of-function research in the Wuhan Institute.”1 8 However, NIH’s funding of this research can be easily double-checked.

In a Truth in Media report, 19 investigative reporter Ben Swann discusses substantiates proving Fauci lied to Congress, including a article entitled “SARS-Like WIV1-CoV Poised for Human Emergence, ”2 0 submitted to PNAS in 2015 and subsequently published in 2016. In the present working paper, the authors state 😛 TAGEND

“Overall, the results from these studies foreground the practicality of a scaffold that leverages metagenomics findings and reverse genetics to identify prepandemic menaces. For SARS-like WIV1-CoV, the data can inform surveillance planneds, improve diagnostic reagents, and facilitate effective medicines to mitigate future emergence events.

However, building new and chimeric reagents must be carefully weighing up potential gain-of-function( GoF) concerns.”

At the end of the working paper, the authors thank “Dr. Zhengli-Li Shi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology for access to bat CoV sequences and plasmid of WIV1-CoV spike protein.” They too specify that the research was supported by the NIAID under the grant awards U19AI109761 and U19AI107810, which together total $41.7 million.

As noted by Swann, this paper clearly spells out that the NIAID spent $41.7 million on GOF research, with the aim of determining how bat coronaviruses can be made more pathogenic to humans, and that this research continued after the 2014 moratorium on such funding was implemented.

Shortly after the March 2021 Senate hearing, WIV removed mentions of cooperation and collaboration with Fauci’s NIAID, NIH and other U.S. research partners from its website. 21 It too removed descriptions of GOF research on the SARS virus. This appears to be an struggled cover-up , is not simply of their own involvement but likewise American government involvement.

Several members of the U.S. Congress, however, have recently been vowed to propel their own investigation to explore the lab accident theory. The Energy and Commerce Committee has also requested extended records from both the NIH and EcoHealth Alliance detailing research and collaborations with WIV. 22 As George Washington famously said, “Truth will ultimately prevail where there are plans taken to fetch it to light.”2 3

Read more: articles.mercola.com

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